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ABSTRACT 
A honeypot is a non-production system, design to interact with cyber-attackers to 
collect intelligence on attack techniques and behaviors.  While the security community is 
reaping fruits of this collection tool, the hacker community is increasingly aware of this 
technology.  In response, they develop anti-honeypot technology to detect and avoid 
honeypots.  Prior to the discovery of newer intelligence collection tools, we need to 
maintain the relevancy of honeypot.  Since the development of anti-honeypot technology 
indicates the deterrent effect of honeypot, we can capitalize on this deterrent effect to 
develop fake honeypot.  Fake honeypot is real production system with deterring 
characteristics of honeypot that induces the avoidance behavior of cyber-attackers.  Fake 
honeypots will provide operators with workable production systems under obfuscation of 
deterring honeypot when deployed in hostile information environment.  Deployed in a 
midst of real honeynets, it will confuse and delay cyber-attackers.  To understand the 
effects of honeypot on cyber-attackers to design fake honeypot, we exposed a tightly 
secured, self-contained virtual honeypot to the Internet over a period of 28 days.  We 
conclude that it is able to withstand the duration of exposure without compromise.  The 
metrics pertaining to the size of last packet suggested departure of cyber-attackers during 
reconnaissance. 
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All warfares are based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must 
seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are 
near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, 
we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the 
enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. –  
      Sun Tzu, the Art of War 
The advent of Information Technology (IT) has revolutionized the conduct of 
commerce, education, socio-politics and military operations.  While the technology has 
been assimilated into our daily lives to increase our competence, capacity and 
convenience, it has obscured the operational details of these processes.  This lack of 
detailed information offers cyber-attackers an opportunity for exploitations.  Information 
on these exploits is usually restricted to the hacker communities, hence it poses a great 
challenge for the security community to understand and defend their systems. 
The “Honeynet Project” started June 2000 with the mandate to collect intelligence 
on exploitations and raise awareness of cyber-threats and vulnerabilities.  They use and 
provide tools and techniques, predominantly in the form of honeypots, in their research.  
Honeypots are systems that are not intended for any production or authorized activity.  
Hence, any activities, other than those generated by the administrators of the honeypots,  
are deemed unauthorized or illicit.  This value of honeypots lies in the collection of these 
activities (The Honeynet Project, 2004).  Honeynets extend the concept of honeypots to 
create networks of honeypots, thereby increasing the value that we can derive beyond 
individual honeypot.  However, cyber-attackers soon gain awareness of such intelligence 
collection tools.  This suggests that honeypots could be detected by cyber-attackers, 
which could reduce the value of honeypots.  (Rowe, 2006) suggested to capitalize on the 
intent of cyber-attackers to avoid honeypots; the concept of fake honeypots was proposed 
as a defensive technique to deter and delay cyber-attackers. 
The objective of this thesis is to learn more through experiments about the 
decision cycle of cyber-attackers.  The goal is to provide appropriate countermeasures by 
breaking the attackers’ decision cycle.  We aim to establish the noticeable features of 
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honeypots from the cyber-attackers’ perspective.  Capitalizing on the deterrence effect of 
honeypots, we can design fake honeypots to deter and delay exploitations.  Fake 
honeypots behave like honeypots from the cyber-attackers perspective. They, however, 
can be production systems and do not need to record exploitation techniques.  Due to the 
fear of detection by the honeypot administrator, coupled with the assumed lack of 
usefulness of honeypots for normal cyber-attackers, fake honeypots deter cyber-attackers 
from further reconnaissance and exploitation.  A random population of fake honeypots 
amidst real honeypots in enterprise networks could create uncertainties to confuse and 
delay the decision of cyber-attackers upon detection of potential honeypots. 
The setup of our experiments includes the installation and configuration of a 
honeypot.  We collected and compared results from existing real honeypots and fake 
honeypots.  We analyzed the data to identify evidence of deterrence or “fear” of cyber-
attackers.  Based on this evidence, we discuss the usefulness of fake honeypots for 
information-security defense.   
The key concepts of the thesis such as honeypots along with the survey of related 
works, are given in Chapter II.  Chapter III gives the problem statement, assumptions and 
intent.  Chapter IV details the test bed setup, configuration, and rationale of the honeypot 
including hardware, software and network details.  Data analysis is given in Chapter IV.  
Chapter V provides conclusions and suggestions for application.  Appendix A includes 
other results generated from the honeynet.  Appendix B includes the source code for the 
two Java classes.  
3 
II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background related to our study.  The first and second 
sections provide a process for modeling threats and decision cycles.  The third to fifth 
sections provide the history and overview of honeypots and anti-honeypot/anti-honeynet 
technology.  The sixth section highlight the difference in intrusion detection and 
prevention systems and their relevancy in the honeypot implementation. The seventh 
section examines the importance of system integrity in implementation of a honeypot.  
The last section elaborates on data collection techniques and their associated tools.   
 
A. OBSERVATION, ORIENTATION, DECISION AND ACTION (OODA) 
LOOP  
The key to military victory is to create situations wherein one can make 
appropriate decisions and translate these decisions into executions more quickly than the 
adversaries.  (Boyd, 1976) hypothesized that all intelligent organisms undergo a 
continuous cycle of interaction with their environment. Boyd breaks this cycle down to 
four inter-related and overlapping continuous processes, namely observation (collection 
of data), orientation (analysis and synthesis of data to form current mental perspective), 
decision (determination of a course of action based on current mental perspective) and 
action (physical execution of decisions).  This decision cycle is known as the OODA 
loop. 
Analysis of cyber-attacks reveals that the same decision cycle is involved.  
Penetration and understanding of the cyber-attackers’ OODA cycle provides us with a 
framework to devise an effective security plan.   
 
B. THREAT MODELING IN COMPUTER SECURITY 
To devise a cost-effective security plan, we must understand our threat vis-à-vis 
the value of assets to be protected.  Understanding the adversary’s view of the system is a 
critical step in threat modeling process.  (Swiderski, 2004) suggested a threat modeling 

























Figure 1.   High-level Process of Threat Modeling. 
 
C. HONEYPOTS (THE HONEYNET PROJECT, 2004) 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of 
a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy 
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 
      - Sun Tzu, the Art of War 
1. Know Your Enemy 
The concept of warfare in cyberspace is similar to that of conventional warfare.  
Understanding our capabilities and vulnerabilities, vis-à-vis that of the adversaries, 
allows us to devise defensive and offensive plans.  Prior to October 1999, there was very 
little information about cyber-attacker threats, motives, and techniques.  The Honeynet 
Project was officially incorporated in July 2001 as a nonprofit organization to collect and 
analyze cyber-attack intelligence to support awareness.  Since unique exploit motives and 
techniques are known only to cyber-attacker communities, and otherwise often not 
widely known, the Honeynet Project has to devise and employ creative attack-data 
collection tools like honeypots and honeynets. 
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2. Definition of Honeypot 
“A honeypot is an information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized 
or illicit use of that resource (The Honeynet Project, 2004).”  A honeypot is not 
designated as a production-oriented component of an information infrastructure.  As 
such, nobody should be using or interacting with honeypots; any transactions or 
interactions with a honeypot are by definition unauthorized.   
 
3. Variations of Honeypots 
There are two categories of honeypots: low-interaction and high-interaction.  
Low-interaction honeypots are passive and cyber-attackers are limited to emulated 
services rather than actual operating systems.  They are generally easier to deploy and 
pose minimal risk to the administrators.  Examples are Honeyd, Specter and KFSensor.  
High-interaction honeypots provide entire operating systems and applications for 
attackers to interact.  They are more complex and serve as better intelligence-collection 
tools.  However, they pose higher level of risk to the administrator due to the potential of 
compromise by cyber-attackers, as for instance, with the use of compromised honeypots 
to propagate other attacks.  
 
4. Uses of Honeypots 
Honeypots can be deployed as production or research systems.  When deployed as 
production systems, different honeypots can serve to prevent, detect and respond to 
attacks.  When deployed as research systems, they serve to collect information on threats 
for analysis and security enhancement. 
 
5. Honeynets 
Similarly to the transition of low-interaction to high interaction honeypots, the 
value of honeypots can be further extended by networking.  Putting honeypots into 
networks provide cyber-attackers a realistic network of systems to interact with, and 




6. Virtual Honeynets 
Virtual honeynets (The Honeynet Project, 2004) use virtual machines like 
VMware to emulate multiple systems with different operating systems on a single 
hardware.  While reducing the hardware requirements for the administrators, the virtual 
guest machines offer cyber-attackers the perspective of independent systems in the 
networks.  It reduces the cost and management for both production and research 
purposes.  There are, however, disadvantages to deployment of virtual honeynets.  The 
use of virtual machines is limited to the hardware virtualization software and the host 
operating system.  The secured management of the host operating system and the 
virtualization software has to be thoroughly planned and executed.  A compromise to 
either software may allow cyber-attackers to seize control of the entire honeynet.  It is 
easier to fingerprint a virtual honeynet, as opposed to honeynets deployed with real 
hardware, by the presence of virtualization software and signatures of the virtual 
hardware emulated by the virtualization software.  Cyber-attackers may potentially 
identify these signatures and avoid these machines, thereby defeating the purpose of 
deploying the honeynet. 
 
D. ANTI-HONEYPOT TECHNOLOGY 
As the security professionals begin to include honeypots or honeynets into their 
arsenal for information defense, cyber-attackers have reacted with anti-honeypot 
technology.  (Krawetz, 2004) opined that the emergence of these honeypot detection tools 
suggested that honeypots were indeed affecting the operations of cyber-attackers.  This 
technology can probably be extended to address the detection of diverse honeypots.  
(Holz and Raynal, 2005) introduced several techniques and tools applicable to cyber-
attackers to detect suspicious environments (e.g., virtual machines and presence of 
debuggers).  They presented the detection of Sebek by measuring execution time of the 
read() system call.  Table 1 shows the various implementations of other honeypots and 







Methods for Detecting the Honeypot 
BackOfficer Friendly Restricted emulated 
services and responses 
Send different requests and verify the consistency 
of responses for different services. 
Honeyd Signature based 
responses 
Send a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate 
traffic/payload, with common signatures 
recognized by targeted honeypots. 
Symantec Decoy Server 
or Virtual Honeynet 
Virtualization  Detect virtual hardware, for instance Media 
Access Control (MAC) addresses. 
Snort_inline Modification actions Send different packets and verify the existence 
and integrity of response packets. 
Virtual Honeynet System files Probe for existence of VMware.   
Active Tcpdump 
session or Sebek 
Logging processes Scan for active logging process or increased 
round-trip time (for instance, due to read(1) in 
Sebek-based honeypots). 
 
Table 1.   Detecting Anti-Honeypot/Honeynet Technology. 
 
E. FAKE HONEYNETS 
Capitalizing on the advent of anti-honeypot/honeynet technology, (Rowe, 2006) 
suggested the use of fake honeypots to deter and delay cyber-attacks.  These are real 
production systems with the signatures or behaviors of honeynets to deter cyber-attacks.  
The suggested metrics (Rowe, 2006) to guide design of good honeypots may be used by 
cyber-attackers to detect and avoid potential honeypots.  Using the anti-
honeypot/honeynet technology during reconnaissance, the cyber-attacker may believe a 
system with poor metrics score is a honeypot, thus, avoid exploitation of the system.  
This defensive approach capitalizes on the dislike of cyber-attackers for honeynets.  With 
the current computing and memory capacities, a fake honeynet is most easily 
implemented on a real machine as a self-contained virtual honeynet. 
 
F. INTRUSION PREVENTION SYSTEM 
As part of Defense-in-Depth approach to Information Security, Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) are commonly deployed to detect potential incoming threats 
based on signature sets or anomalies.  However, such systems are passive; they often 
overwhelm administrators with alerts instead of timely response to detected attacks.  
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) are introduced to address this response capability gap.  
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They extend the detection capability of IDS to include automated controls in response to 
cyber-attacks, for instance, to block or modify packets (Rash, Orebaugh, Clark, Pinkard 
and Babbin, 2005).  This capability, however, comes at a significant price to the 
performance of protected networks or systems.  Snort is a well-known IDS which will be 
relevant for post-collection analysis of Tcpdump data in order to detect cyber-attacks 
against honeypots.  Snort_inline builds on the detection capability of Snort.  It informs 
iptables to drop, reject or modify packets in accordance to the rules set.  This will be 
relevant in future investigations to channel cyber-attackers to the path of choice of 
administrators. 
  
G.  SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
To implement a self-contained virtual honeynet, we must try to ensure that the 
host operating system will not be compromised.  If it is compromised, we must be able to 
isolate the compromise.  The typical approach to maintaining system integrity is to 
establish baseline system fingerprints, prior to operations that may result in compromise; 
for instance, one can connect to Internet and periodically monitor changes to the 
computer files against these fingerprints.  These fingerprints can be cryptographic hashes  
stored offline to prevent compromise.  In case of modifications to these files, the 
administrator will investigate if the modifications are legitimate and update the offline 
system fingerprints database accordingly.  There many ways to implement such system 
integrity features.  Tripwire, Intact, and Veracity are some high-end commercially 
available packages.  Osiris is an open-source host-integrity monitoring system that keeps 
the administrator apprised of possible compromises or changes to the file system, resident 
kernel modules, or user and group lists.  Alternatively, scripts or programs can be written 
to automate the hashing of system files. 
 
H. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
(Jones, 2006) categorized the four types of Network-Based Evidence (NBE) for 
analysis.  These include full session data, session data, alert data, and statistical data.  Full 
content data consists of the actual packets, typically including the headers and application 
information, as seen on the transmission media.  This produces complete information but 
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will take significant disk space.  Wireshark (or formerly known as Ethereal) is a memory-
intensive application that captures full content data over the network connections, with a 
good user-interface for full content data analysis.  Tcpdump is a lightweight tool used for 
similar collection.  With these tools, analysts are usually overwhelmed with too much 
information.  Richer analysis is normally conducted by examining session data of 
particularly interesting sessions with tools like Scanmap3d.  However, the challenge is 
often to identify the session of interest.  Alert data generated by Snort, shoki and Bro 
offer intrusion detection alerts through signatures and rules, and these usually represent 
much less data than the session data.  Statistical data on system parameters are often 
useful for performance monitoring.  Such monitoring can trigger new alerts that may not 
be obvious at lower (more detailed) levels.  Tcpstat and Tcpdstat are common open-
source statistical tools.  
Tcpdump data was the main source of data collected for the project reported here.  
While Wireshark provided most common processing tools required for the analysis of the 
Tcpdump data, the processed data did not fit perfectly into our analysis requirement.  As 
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III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Without constant innovation and improvement in the deployment of honeypots, 
their effectiveness will decrease with the increasing awareness of the cyber-attackers.  
Signatures to detect honeypots could be available to enable cyber-attackers to avoid 
honeypots much as they are for permitting defenders to recognize attacks.  Till the advent 
of newer cyber-attack intelligence collection tools, we need to maintain the effectiveness 
and relevancy of honeypots.  While cyber-attackers have devise mechanisms to evade our 
detection and protection system, we can, likewise, deploy real and fake honeynets to 
create confusion and obfuscation evade their reconnaissance and attacks. 
Honeypots have been deployed to prevent, detect and respond to attacks, 
however, they are usually restricted to conventional passive deployment at enterprise 
level.  The deployment of an active self-contained virtual honeynet as a preventive 
security measure for the individual host terminal, rather than as a data collection tool, has 
not been tested.  This thesis explores the use of a self-contained virtual honeynet as part 
of defense-in-depth mechanisms for a rapid response deployment scenario where 
operators are constrained by the small logistics footprint.  
 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Threat Model 
For purpose of this thesis, we categorize cyber-attackers into the following 
groups. 
a.  Ignorant Cyber-Attackers  
These cyber-attackers are assumed to be ignorant of the existence of 
honeypot technology and do not understand its nature.  They consist of “script kiddies” or 
novice amateurs with little experiences in offensive information operations.  Their wares 
are often downloaded from the Internet or distributed by fellow cyber-attackers.  They are 
motivated by thrill, challenge, pleasure, recognition and occasionally profit (in terms of 
“owning” machines as bots).  Most of them can be prevented by standard good security 
management of systems. 
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b.  Honeypot-Aware Cyber-Attackers  
These are aware of honeypot technology and use a combination of 
automated hacking tools, armed with signatures of potential honeypots, and manual 
attack techniques.  They may be experienced in offensive information operations.  They 
use risk assessment and are cautious in their navigations and attacks.  Generally they will 
be “scared” off by the existence of honeypots since there are so many easier targets.  
They may be motivated by knowledge and mission requirements.  This is the ideal group 
target for fake honeypots. 
c.  Advanced Cyber-Attackers  
These have detailed knowledge of honeypots.  They are usually goal-
specific in nature, able to stealthily probe potential honeypots to distinguish real and fake 
ones.  Fake honeypots are not designed to deceive this group.  However, when deployed 
amidst real honeypots, it is expected that fakes will obscure the real ones, hence slowing 
the decision cycle of these cyber-attackers.  In addition, it may create frustration for these 
cyber-attackers, leading to emotional, rather than logical, reactions (Rowe, 2006).  
 
C. GOAL 
The goal of this thesis is to establish the existence of different behavior of cyber-
attackers towards the honeypots.  Subsequently these reactions can be exploited in fake 
honeypots to deter honeypot-aware cyber-attackers.  We will also explore the feasibility 





IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
This chapter details the hardware, software, and layout of the honeynet used in 
experiments.  We report the problems encountered in setting up the experiment.  We also 
discuss the motivation behind the Java program to analyze Tcpdump data. 
 
A. EXPERIMENT SPECIFICATION 
1. Hardware Specification 
The hardware setup prepared by (Duong, 2006) in her M.S. thesis was maintained 
as a control setup of a real honeynet.  It consisted of three computers, namely the Router, 
Honeynet and Data Capture machine.  In addition, a Dell Inspiron Laptop was set up with 
a self-contained virtual honeynet to serve as the fake honeynet.  Instead of a full-fledged 
router machine, a Belkin Router was used to perform create the network address 


















Router (Dell Dimension XPS B933) 
Processor Intel Pentium III – 933MHz 
Storage Maxtor (Ultra ATA) – 20GB 
Memory 512MB 
NIC Davicom Semiconductor 21x4x DEC Tulip – Compatible 
10/100Mbps 
3Com 3C905C – TX Fast Etherlink 10/100Mbps 
3Com 3C905C – TX Fast Etherlink 10/100Mbps 
Drives DVD-ROM, CD-RW, Zip, Floppy 
 
Honeynet (Dell Optiplex GX520) 
Processor Intel Pentium 4 -2.80GHz 
Storage (Serial ATA) – 40GB 
Memory 1024 MB 
NIC DELL NetXtreme BCM5751 Gigabit Ethernet PCI Express 
(integrated) 
Drives CD-RW, Floppy 
 
Data Capture (Gateway) 
Processor Intel Pentium 4 – 1.80GHz 
Storage Western Digital (Ultra ATA) – 40GB 
Memory 256 MB 
NIC EthernExpress Pro/100 VE (integrated) 
Drives CD-RW, Floppy 
 
Fake Self-contained Honeynet (Dell Inspiron 6000) 
Processor Intel Pentium 4 – 1.86GHz 
Storage Seagate (Ultra ATA) – 80GB 
Memory 1.25 GB 
NIC Broadcom 440x 10/100 Integrated Controller 
Dell_Wireless WLAN Card 
Drives NEC ND-6650A 8x DVD+/-RW 
Router Belkin Wireless G Router 
 











Real Honeynet Setup Fake Honeynet Setup
 
 
Figure 2.   Hardware Setup. 
 
2. Software Specification 
The software specification from Duong’s honeynet setup was maintained.  In 
addition, SUSE Linux 10 was installed on the Fake Honeynet machine.  The intent was to 
replicate the software configuration of the honeynet to provide common basis of 
comparison. 
In light of the increasing popularity of scanners for VMware as means to detect 
honeynets, VMware 5.5 was setup to host a Microsoft Windows XP Professional with 
Service Pack 2 and a Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced Server with Service Pack 4.  
Figure 3 shows the fake honeynet setup.   
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Figure 3.   Fake Honeynet Setup. 
 
As the two guest operating systems were to simulate honeypots, they were not 
fully equipped with all common applications and services.  As it would be uncommon for 
a user to use machines without common applications like Microsoft Office, this served as 
another attempt to fool attackers as to the presence of a honeynet.  Lastly, the Snort 
intrusion-detection system and Tcpdump packet collector were installed, though only 
Tcpdump was running as an active process.  Tcpdump was selected due to its lightweight 
ability to capture full content data as opposed to other tools.  This served to create the 
impression of active logging characteristic of honeynet.  All software was fully patched 
with the latest updates, and the baseline fingerprints for the host Linux machines were 
obtained using the Host System Integrity Monitoring System Osiris 4.2.2 prior to 
connection to Internet.  As opposed to the real honeypot, the integrity of the guest 
operating systems (OS) on the fake honeynet, namely the Windows XP Professional and 
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Windows 2000 Advanced Server, is of lesser concern as they are not part of the 
production systems.  The only concern is that that they may be “owned” or compromised 
and used as launch pad for other attacks.  This risk can be significantly reduced by 
frequent remounting of fresh guest operating system and activation of automatic updates. 
The analysis machines were not included in the experiment setup.  They were 
used to test for network connectivity and perform troubleshooting.  Wireshark was 
installed on a separate machine to facilitate analysis of full content data. 
 
Router (SUSE Linux 10) 
Primary Goal Sniff traffic, send captured data to Data Capture  
Software Snort 2.4.3 – intrusion detection system 
Tcpdump – packets capture 
 
Honeynet (SUSE Linux 10) 
Primary Goal Solicit attacks 
Storage Tcpdump – packets capture 
VMware Workstation 5.5 hosting  
 Windows 2000 Advanced Server with SP4
 Windows XP Professional with SP2 
 
Data Capture (SUSE Linux 10) 
Primary Goal Store Snort Data 
Storage PostgreSQL 8.1.1 
 
Fake Self-contained Honeynet (SUSE Linux 10) 
Primary Goal Solicit/Deter attacks 
Storage Osiris/Unix integrity checker 
Tcpdump – packets capture 
VMware Workstation 5.5 hosting  
 Windows 2000 Advanced Server with SP4
 Windows XP Professional with SP2 
 










B. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Full-content Tcpdump data was collected at the Ethernet interface over a period of 
28 days for the fake honeynet.  The Pcap dump file was collected on a weekly basis for 
analysis.  Similar data was conducted for the real honeynet over a period of 21 days. 
Wireshark was used to process the Pcap file into readable text.  We were, in 
particular, interested in the TCP sessions.  They can be obtained using the 
Statistics|Sessions commands.  To facilitate subsequent analyses, the name resolution box 
was unchecked to allow the unresolved addresses to be displayed instead of default 
resolved addresses.   
In addition to the session information, we would like to find similar information 
between a pair of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.  We termed this as IP connection.  The 
last packet of interest, however, -- a particular interest of ours -- was not offered by 
standard built-in utility of Wireshark.  Selected displayed fields from Wireshark were 
captured for further analysis.  They included: 
 
Field Packet Description 
Serial Number Serial number of the packet 
Time Time elapsed since issuance of a collection command. 
SrcIP Source Internet Protocol address 
SrcPort Source port 
DestIP Destination Internet Protocol address 
DestPort Destination port 
Size Size of packet in bytes 
 
Table 4.   Field Values of Packets Obtained from Wireshark. 
 
Two simple Java classes were developed to digest these exported files.  The first  
“tcpdumpAnalysisConnectionLastPacket” read the exported files from Wireshark, 
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filtered the last packet of each connection between two machines (based on their IP 
addresses), and generated an output file containing the meta-data of the last packet of 
each connection.  The second “tcpdumpAnalysisConnectionSocketPairSizeCountTime” 
class read the IP address of interest and the exported files from Wireshark, and generated 
the cumulative size and count of each socket-pair across time.  It provided an output file 
containing the meta-data of the last packet of socket pair of interest.  The procedure 
followed by these programs is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Wireshark Export
Fit into designated 
format? No
















Lock the Working 
Array entry with 
update =1 




Working Array to 




Unlock the Working 
Array entry with 
update = 0 
Print Storage Array to 
Output File
Input Reader Last Packet Filtering Engine Output Generator  
 
Figure 4.   Algorithm of tcpdumpAnalysisConnectionLastPacket class. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This chapter details the analysis of results of the collection of the Tcpdump data.   
It highlights network traffic trends observed which may be useful for future investigation. 
 
A. SECURITY OF FAKE HONEYNET 
One goal of this investigation was to determine the effectiveness of the fake 
honeynet to deter or confuse the cyber-attackers.  The intent was not to employ it as the 
core security mechanism but as part of a comprehensive suite of secured management for 
information systems to achieve defense-in-depth.  Using standard practices for secured 
management of information systems, the fake honeynet was patched and tightened.  The 
initial system fingerprints were generated using an MD5sum script and Osiris was 
installed to manage the system integrity.  The guest and host operating systems interfaced 
with the Internet behind a Belkin router that provided NAT.  Standard application 
firewalls were, in addition, maintained to prevent hostile traffic from reaching the host 
operating system.  We ran the collected Tcpdump data through Snort 2.4.5 and received 
no alerts that suggested successful break-in to host and guest operating system.  All  
alerts received are of Priority 3 (low priority).  In addition, our scanning of our network-
based evidence showed no break-in behavior, as for instance the installation of rootkits.  
Along with the results of our system integrity check, we can assert with some confidence 
that the host operating system was not compromised in the 28 days of exposure.   
 
B. TRAFFIC VOLUME OF HONEYNET 
Due to the limitations of our experimental design, the good state of security of the 
host operating system offered limited insights into the decision cycle of the cyber-
attackers.  Figure 6 shows the number of TCP sessions for the fake and real honeynets.   
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Figure 6.   Plot of TCP Session Count for Fake Honeypot Across Weeks. 
 
The traffic on the fake honeynet was significantly lower than traffic of the real 
honeynet.  For the first week, the fake honeynet was set up at home with the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP) of Comcast.  We attributed this to the inaccessibility of the IP 
address.  In the second week, we shifted the fake honeynet to the same subnet of the real 
honeynet and TCP traffic volume increased significantly.  The IP address of the real 
honeynet had been available to hackers for almost a year and had been disseminated 
online.  As such, its subnet could be deemed a hot zone for TCP traffic. 
In the third week, we experimented with the advertisement of both the real and 
fake honeynets in Web logs (blogs) and hackers’ discussion forum.  The effect of 
advertisement was a 6-fold increase in TCP traffic.  In addition, we received information, 
from the hackers’ discussion forum, pertaining to our system configurations and our 
physical address.  There were comments that our fake honeynet was so tightly maintained 
that it was difficult for an amateur hacker to break into our system.  This further 
supported our assertion on the security of the fake honeynet.  In the fourth week we 
observed a 50% drop in our TCP traffic, possibly due to the loss of interest in the 
honeynet.  The results of their reconnaissance might have suggested that they were not 
adequately equipped with tools for further reconnaissance or exploitation.  In addition, 
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the fourth week coincided with the Thanksgiving weekend, which may have affected the 
American hackers, though the wide distribution of attack times suggested that we were 
also getting attacks from all over the world.  Either explanation supports the hypothesis  
that most cyber-attackers that were visiting our honeynet were amateur.  While 
professional awareness of anti-honeypot technology began in 2003, it appeared that the 
amateurs visiting our honeynet still lacked awareness or tools pertaining to anti-honeypot 
technology.  So it appeared that the fear or deterrent effect could not be observed with the 
existing amateur cyber-attackers. 
 
C. BELIEVABILTY OF FAKE HONEYNET 
To deceive, we needed to establish believability of a honeynet from the 
perspective of the cyber-attackers.  We attempted to duplicate the setup of the real 
honeynet within the constraints.  The lightweight self-contained constraint helped 
deployability while maintaining a high level of interaction.  The fully functional guest 
and host operating systems were connected to the Internet through a bridged 
configuration, where the VMware emulated multiple virtual network interfaces with the 
single physical network interface of the host system.  The Belkin router G was used to 
provide Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) services and assigned each 
operating system a unique IP address.  This would be a typical network configuration for 
home or office, especially with the increasing popularity of wireless home or office 
networks.  From the perspective of the cyber-attackers, it was difficult to decide if the 
downstream machines were physical or virtual machines, let alone real or fake honeypots.   
Figure 7 compares the number of TCP sessions for real and fake honeynet.  The 
figures for each week varied significantly.  Reference the discussion above, the variation 
was attributed to the established IP address used by the real honeynet.  Ignoring week 1, 
it was interesting to note that session counts were increasing and decreasing similarly 
over the subsequent weeks.  Hence we could conclude that the fake honeynet were not 
significantly different from the real honeynet from the perspective of the cyber-attackers 
over the network. 
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Figure 7.   Plot of TCP Session Counts Across Weeks. 
 
D. SESSION ANALYSIS 
The session statistics were generated by Wireshark.  The ratio of received to sent 
bytes for each honeynet machine was plotted against the session number with sessions 
numbered in order of occurrence, with the associated IP address listed for each session.  
The plots for Windows 2000 Advanced Server were used for discussion in this chapter, 
and the others are in Appendix A. 
Figures 8, 9, and 10 show plots for weeks 2, 3, and 4.  In week 2 the ratio value 
ranged from 0.76 to 12.93.  Based on similar observations, we concluded that ratios 
above three suggested legitimate sessions between the two machines, for instance, a 
download of data from the designated IP port address.  Ratio values within the limits of 
one to three indicated session support activities like an attempt to set up a session or 
request services.  Excluding the first data point, Figure 9 illustrates session support 
activities where the ratio values vary from 1.68 to 2.93, where the machine was 
performing a domain name system (DNS) query to our DNS server.  The “recursion 
desired” flag was set to one and this resulted in many queries to that IP port address.  
Further inspection of the associated raw packets revealed that this behavior was triggered 
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by Windows 2000 Advanced Server in our honeynet with intended destination of 
update.microsoft.com.  We assumed this to be benign traffic, but a similar traffic profile 
involving a different remote site might have been deemed a port scan and triggered alerts.  
This suggested the need to be turn off automatic updates when setting up 
honeypot/honeynet to remove these alerts, as it might mask other interesting traffic from 
cyber-attackers.  The administrator, however, can schedule manual updates in a 
controlled fashion, in order to maintain the currency of the system.  In fact, other than 
initial network diagnostics to confirm network connectivity, a honeynet should refrain 
from usage like web-browsing and downloading of application or updates, to prevent the 
generation of unnecessary traffic.  The spike in Figure 10 is the download of updates 
from Microsoft Corporation whereas the ensuing traffic could be a suspicious port scan. 
 





















































































































































































































Figure 8.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Windows Server (Week 2). 
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Figure 9.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Windows Server (Week 3). 










































































































































































































































E. TIME DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
We coded a simple Java program to add two fields to the each packet obtained 
from the Tcpdump data.  The fields were cumulative count and cumulative size of the 
packet for each session.  We further processed the data to obtain the ratio of actual 
cumulative size to estimated cumulative size, where the estimated cumulative size is the 
product of current packet size and quantity of packets received in the session.  Under 
normal circumstances, the ratio should be close to one to indicate a consistent flow of 
bytes between the two sockets.  It was however not predictably observed from our data. 
A trend of the ratio nearly constant might indicate a standard automated scan, for 
instance a TCP SYN flag scan, or it could be a perfectly legitimate session with packets 
of similar sizes.  However, a legitimate session should usually terminate with a spike for 
the ratio.  This assumes that the best way to transfer bytes across the network should 
maximize the bandwidth to the limit of the maximum transfer unit (MTU), as for instance 
1500 bytes for the Ethernet.  As the last packet transferred under such circumstances 
might not be a full 1500 bytes, this could result in a spike in the ratio.   
Figure 11 shows that the host Linux operating system had high-intensity packet 
traffic at the beginning and at 360000 seconds.  In addition, there were also four clusters 
of relatively low-intensity traffic.  We realized that the four clusters corresponded to daily 
system network maintenance, whereas the first spike indicated the traffic created during 
the initial honeynet setup.  Since the honeynet setup was performed on a Thursday, the 
second spike corresponded the service check conducted on the following Monday. 
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Figure 11.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Linux Host 
Operating System (Week 2). 
 
Figure 12 showing the traffic on the Windows Advanced Server is considerably more 
eventful.  It illustrates the effect of our IP address advertisement on blogs and hacker 
discussion forums.  We observed high intensity traffic in the around the ratio of 1.  In 
addition, the relatively high intensity of data points in the vertical direction indicated that 
packet traffic occurred very quickly.  Since this was a honeynet machine, traffic of such 
extent and intensity should not be observed unless there were automated reconnaissances.  
The second observation was the relatively consistent ceiling at a ratio of 24.  Assuming 
that software made the best effort to maximize of the utility of the 1500 bytes MTU, we 
could see there were numerous interweaving scanning packets of approximately 60 bytes 
with other potentially legitimate data transfers (at 1500 bytes). 
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Figure 12.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Windows 2000 
Advanced Server Operating System (Week 3). 
 
F. PACKET SIZE ANALYSIS 
We attempted to observe the trends in the distribution of size of packets received 
by the honeynet.  Figures 13, 14 and 15 shows the frequency of size of each packet 
received by the honeynet collected over three weeks,, respectively.  The modes of week 2 
and 3 indicate high frequency of data transfer where the packet sizes reach the limit of the 
Ethernet MTU.  This is commonly observed in any Ethernet network.  The mode for 
week 4 indicates that a relatively high frequency of packet sizes between 50 to 100 bytes.  
This may be useful to indicate reconnaissance activities.  We investigated further into 


























Figure 13.   Histogram of Size of Packets Received by Fake Honeynet (Week 2). 
 






















Figure 14.   Histogram of Size of Packets Received by Fake Honeynet (Week 3). 
31 
 

























Figure 15.   Histogram of Size of Packets Received by Fake Honeynet (Week 4). 
 
G. LAST PACKET RECEIVED ANALYSIS 
We developed another Java program to extract information pertaining to the last 
received packet of each connection between two IP addresses (regardless of ports).  A 
connection between two machines could be made up of several sessions.  Since the 
honeynet was not designed to be a production system, termination of a connection might 
indicate a loss of interest or actual fear of the honeynet.  The results generated from the 
Tcpdump data using the Java class was plotted into histograms as shown in Figures 16, 
17 and 18.  It can be observed that these plots are cleaner modulated plots of Figures 13, 
14 and 15, respectively.  The histograms revealed that three distinct regions of sizes with 
relatively high frequency.  They were last-packet sizes of 50-100, 500-600, and 900-950 
bytes.  Following the above discussion on small packets, we tabulated the percentage of 
traffic where the last-packet size was between 50 and 100 bytes, in Table 5.  
 
32 
Data Set Percentage of Traffic 
Week 2 44% 
Week 3 79% 
Week 4 10% 
 
Table 5.   Percentage of Traffic with Packet Size Between 50 and 100 Bytes.  
 
Week 3 was the week when we solicited traffic through active advertisement.  
Near to 80% of the connections ended with packets of size between 50 to 100 bytes.  
While we could not assert if the cyber-attackers were aware of the existence of our fake 
honeynet, the above traffic might fit into a typical departure signature during 
reconnaissance. 






















Figure 16.   Histogram of Size of Last Received Packet by Fake Honeynet (Week 2). 
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Figure 17.   Histogram of Size of Last Received Packet by Fake Honeynets (Week 3). 



















Figure 18.   Histogram of Size of Last Received Packet by Fake Honeynets (Week 4). 
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We further investigated into the distribution of protocol and flags of the last 
received packets for our self-contained virtual honeypots.  Tables 6, 7 and 8 shows the 
distribution of the protocol and flags set for the last packets received by our self-
contained virtual honeypots .   
 





221.208.208.92 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62.213.130.127 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.83 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.196 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.203 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.239.53.9 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.239.37.104 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.231.63.58 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.102.7.99 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.230.200.100 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.102.7.99 TCP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.102.7.99 TCP 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 7 9 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6.   Distribution of Protocol and Flags for Last Packets (Week 2).  
 





66.102.7.99 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
63.245.209.31 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.35.214.30 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.216.56 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.216.62 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
128.241.21.146 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.73.86.52 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.73.86.91 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.130.100 NTP 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.209.126 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
65.55.192.29 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
207.46.212.62 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
131.107.115.28 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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207.46.13.30 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
207.46.221.222 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
207.46.13.28 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
66.77.84.82 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66.77.84.82 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
207.46.212.62 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 18 6 18 0 11 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 7.   Distribution of Protocol and Flags for Last Packets (Week 3).  
 





66.102.7.99 TCP 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
210.51.23.237 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.80 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
195.27.116.145 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.174.170.115 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.52 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
210.51.21.136 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.130.100 NTP 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.196 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.195 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
220.164.140.249 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
218.10.137.140 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
207.46.209.126 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
194.145.63.131 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
195.0.19.0 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.221.241.74 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60.11.125.44 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.209.110.48 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.112.90.240 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.75 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60.11.125.42 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.239.12.110 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.40.92.223 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.201 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.66 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.92 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.49 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.98 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.253.130.89 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
194.216.135.144 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
204.16.209.20 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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207.46.212.62 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
207.46.253.157 TCP 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
204.16.208.23 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.202 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.209.110.47 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.103 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.10.224.253 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.212 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.90 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
202.97.238.199 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.99 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.209.110.49 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60.11.125.54 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
216.228.2.120 DNS 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
221.208.208.83 Messenger 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 4 44 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 8.   Distribution of Protocol and Flags for Last Packets (Week 4).  
 
We were, however, unable to observe any other trends of interest, except for the 
unusually high User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets on Week 4, despite the reduction 
of network traffic, as mentioned in Section B of this Chapter.  We correlated these UDP 
packets with their sizes and realized that they were responsible for two other modal 
regions where packet sizes ranged within 500-600 and 900-950 bytes.  We checked 
associated source IP addresses of all last packets received by our honeypots and realized 
that our previous observation of packet sizes between 50-100 bytes belonged to 
legitimate traffic generated during the set-up of our honeypots.  They were from 
organizations like Google, Microsoft Corporation, and Redshift (that hosted our DNS 
server).  Further packet inspections revealed no malicious intent.  This, had, however, 
masked the potential signatures of the other two modal regions.  Table 9 shows the 
organization names and countries of location of the source IP addresses responsible for 
the last packets in Week 4.  Deep inspection of packets with Messenger (UDP) protocol 
revealed malicious intent, since they attepted to persuade users to download Windows 




unwary user to assist the cyber-attackers to download root-kits from the designated 
websites.  Figures 19 and 20 show content of malicious intent in packets  responsible for 
the 500-600 and 900-950 bytes modal regions, respectively. 
 
Source IP Protocol Size Organization Name Location 
66.102.7.99 TCP 60 GOOGLE USA 
216.228.2.120 DNS 239 REDSHIFT USA 
216.228.2.120 DNS 334 REDSHIFT USA 
210.51.23.237 Messenger 501 CNCNET-CN CHINA 
204.16.208.80 Messenger 557 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
195.27.116.145 Messenger 922 CW SPAIN 
194.174.170.115 Messenger 922 AS702 GERMANY 
204.16.208.52 Messenger 557 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
210.51.21.136 Messenger 501 CNCNET-CN CHINA 
207.46.130.100 NTP 90 MICROSOFT CORP USA 
202.97.238.196 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
202.97.238.195 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
220.164.140.249 Messenger 942 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
218.10.137.140 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
207.46.209.126 TCP 60 MICROSOFT CORP USA 
194.145.63.131 Messenger 922 DIRBG-AS BULGARIA 
195.0.19.0 Messenger 922 SCARLET BELGIUM 
194.221.241.74 Messenger 922 CW GERMANY 
60.11.125.44 Messenger 940 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.209.110.48 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
194.112.90.240 Messenger 922 CW GERMANY 
204.16.208.75 Messenger 458 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
60.11.125.42 Messenger 942 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
194.239.12.110 Messenger 922 TDC DENMARK 
194.40.92.223 Messenger 922 UNSPECIFIED SWITZERLAND 
202.97.238.201 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
204.16.208.66 Messenger 459 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
221.208.208.92 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
204.16.208.49 Messenger 459 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
221.208.208.98 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
194.253.130.89 Messenger 922 IANA-RSVD-0 DENMARK 
194.216.135.144 Messenger 922 AS702 UK 
204.16.209.20 Messenger 458 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
207.46.212.62 TCP 60 MICROSOFT CORP USA 
207.46.253.157 TCP 60 MICROSOFT CORP USA 
204.16.208.23 Messenger 459 FAST-COLOCATION USA 
202.97.238.202 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.209.110.47 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.208.208.103 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.10.224.253 Messenger 955 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.208.208.212 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
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221.208.208.90 Messenger 501 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
202.97.238.199 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.208.208.99 Messenger 499 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
221.209.110.49 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
60.11.125.54 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
216.228.2.120 DNS 501 REDSHIFT USA 
221.208.208.83 Messenger 500 CHINA169-BACKBONE CHINA 
   
Table 9.   Organization Name and Location of Source IP Addresses for Week 4.  
 
 
Figure 19.   Screen Capture of Packet Inspection for Packet from IP Address 
210.51.23.237 (Packet Size = 501). 
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Figure 20.   Screen Capture of Packet Inspection for Packet from IP Address 
194.145.63.131 (Packet Size = 922). 
 
Figure 21 shows the distribution of the sizes of malicious Messenger (UDP) 
protocol packets.  We  observed that frequencies of packet size of (500 ± 1) and 922 
bytes were significantly higher.  This might indicate that these two packets were more 
popular with the cyber-attackers and would serve as good signatures.  These attacks, 
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however, were passive and would require cooperation of users.  In our context, our 
honeypot may eventually frustrate the cyber-attackers as they gradually learn that we do 
not intend to cooperate with them (in the downloading of root-kits). 
 




























The elementary principle of all deception is to attract the enemy's attention 
to what you wish him to see and to distract his attention from what you do 
not wish him to see. It is by these methods that the skilful conjuror obtains 
his results. –  
Memo to Chiefs of Staff, 1940 from General Wavell, Middle East 
Commander (1939-41) 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
We began the investigation to try to confirm the existence of avoidance behavior 
induced by a honeynet.  We intend to exploit this factor on real production systems to 
deceive cyber-attackers to avoid further reconnaissance and compromise.  We based our 
investigation on the assumption of some awareness and availability of anti-honeypot 
technology among the cyber-attacker community.  As we did not see evidence of 
exploitation after active reconnaissance, our fake honeynet setup did at least withstand 
exposure to the cyber-attackers for 28 days. 
While camouflage does not provide physical protection to the soldiers against 
hostile rounds, it offers concealment through obscurity.  The deployment of a fake 
honeynet aims to achieve similar effects by concealing our real production systems from 
cyber-attackers.  In addition, the fake honeynet serves as protective mimicry when it 
encounters a cyber-attacker, much as how some butterflies create confusing patterns on 
their wings that look like eyes to fool predators.  We believe that widespread deployment 
of fake honeynets amidst real honeynets may create further confusion for cyber-attackers 
and delay or impede their attacks.  It should be noted that security administrators should 
not solely rely on fake honeypots for protection, but skillfully use it as one component in 
the defense-in-depth information security strategy.  
The protection of information system is a broad and complex problem as opposed 
to the relative simplicity of a successful exploitation.  As such, security professionals 
have been lagging in the race against the hackers.  With the introduction of honeynets and 
fake honeynets we can reverse the security power balance.  Professional hackers will  
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have to keep pace with the honeynet development and devote resources to develop anti-
honeynet technology or risk their prized techniques of exploitation and a higher chance of 
being caught and prosecuted.  
 
B. APPLICATIONS 
Fake honeynets can be extended to Rapid Response Command and Control 
(R2C2) systems, scalable communications for regional combatant commanders 
developed by the Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) (SEA-9 R2C2 Team, 
2006).  The self-contained nature of a fake honeynet makes it a suitable lightweight 
candidate for R2C2 systems while providing a two-man team adequate obscurity in 
potentially hostile deployed environment. 
 
C. FUTURE WORKS 
A goal of this thesis assesses the effects of honeynet on cyber-attackers.  Despite 
our IP address advertisements, our fake honeynet received significantly lower traffic 
volume.  It may be attributed to duration of exposure.  While we have deployed a high-
interaction honeynet, our collection mechanism still relies on the initiatives of cyber-
attackers to explore and exploit.  To enhance the rate of solicitation and clarity in the 
cause-and-effect, we will need to be more active in our interaction.  We suggest the 
following future investigations 
1. Tailored Responses to Cyber-attackers.  We need to log reactive behaviors of 
cyber-attackers to our various specific responses to their reconnaissance.  This will 
provide better clarity on effects of deterring responses.  This can be explored with 
Snort_inline. 
2. In-depth Exploration and Exploitation.  In the next phase, cyber-attackers 
should be allowed easy access into the depth of the honeynets.  This will  allow us to 
understand the exploration and exploitation mechanism as well as the reactions (to 




3. Lightweight, High-interaction Honeynets.  We need to continue to design 
lightweight, high-interaction honeynets.  This will facilitate easy deployment of 
honeynet.  In addition, it can be installed on real production systems and function as a 
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APPENDIX A.  RESULT PLOTS 
A. RESULTS FROM SESSION ANALYSIS 
































































































































Figure 22.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Host Linux  (Week 2). 
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Figure 23.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Windows XP  (Week 2). 
 






































































































































































































































































































Figure 24.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Linux  (Week 3). 
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Figure 25.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Windows XP  (Week 3). 
 



















































































































Figure 26.   Plot of Ratio of Received to Sent Bytes for Linux  (Week 4). 
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B. RESULTS FROM TIME DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Session Size vs Time for 



















Figure 28.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Windows 2000 
Advanced Server Operating System (Week 2).   
 
 
Figure 29.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Linux Host 
Operating System (Week 3). 
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Figure 30.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Windows XP 
Operating System (Week 3). 

















Figure 31.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Linux Host 
Operating System (Week 4). 
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Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Session Size vs Time for 


















Figure 32.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Windows 2000 
Advanced Server Operating System (Week 4). 


















Figure 33.   Plot of Ratio of Actual to Estimated Size against Time for Windows XP 
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APPENDIX B.  SOURCE CODES 
/* Obtain the information for Tcpdump and generate the sum(size) and 
//count(packet) for all socket pairs across time. 
// Name tcpdumpAnalysisSocketPairSizeCountTime.java 
// Author@ Harry Lim 






class TcpdumpAnalysisSocketPairSizeCountTime { 
  public static void main (String args[]) throws IOException { 
 
 String Input, filename, ipAddress; 
        int index= 0; 
        int max = 500000; 
        boolean update; 
        int [] size; 
        double [] time; 
        String ia, garbage; 
        String [] srcIP, srcPort, destIP, destPort, protocol; 
        StringTokenizer str; 
         
        //Connection database 
        int i,j,jMax,k; 
        int [] sizeCurrent, sumSizeCurrent, connectionCount; 
        double [] timeCurrent; 
        String [] srcIPCurrent, srcPortCurrent, destIPCurrent, 
destPortCurrent, protocolCurrent; 
                 
        //Initialise input data array 
        size = new int [max]; 
        time = new double [max];         
        srcIP = new String [max]; 
        srcPort = new String [max]; 
        destIP = new String [max]; 
        destPort = new String [max]; 
        protocol =  new String [max]; 
         
        //Initialise storage data array 
        sumSizeCurrent = new int [max]; 
        connectionCount = new int [max]; 
   sizeCurrent = new int [max]; 
        timeCurrent = new double [max];         
        srcIPCurrent = new String [max]; 
        srcPortCurrent = new String [max]; 
        destIPCurrent = new String [max]; 
        destPortCurrent = new String [max]; 
        protocolCurrent =  new String [max]; 
 
         
        //Reading from Tcpdump txt file  
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   filename = args[0]; 
  
          System.out.println("Enter Honeypot IP Address: "); 
          BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new  
          InputStreamReader(System.in)); 
          ia = in.readLine(); 
           
   FileReader fr = new FileReader(filename); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr); 
   //Start-To be removed; for debugging only 
//   PrintWriter fileout = new PrintWriter(new FileWriter("debug-
verify-initialization.txt"));    
   //End-To be removed. 
   while ((Input = br.readLine()) != null) { 
       str = new StringTokenizer (Input); 
              if (str.countTokens() == 9) 
              { 
//                  System.out.println("Error: Wrong number of 
tokens"); 
//                  return; 
//              } 
              garbage  = str.nextToken(); //digest serial number token 
              time [index] = Double.parseDouble(str.nextToken());   
              srcIP [index] = str.nextToken();   
              srcPort [index] = str.nextToken();   
              destIP [index] = str.nextToken();   
              destPort [index] = str.nextToken(); 
              protocol [index] = str.nextToken(); 
              size [index] = Integer.parseInt(str.nextToken()); 
//            System.out.println("SourceIP: "+srcIP[index]+" \t 
SourcePort: "+srcPort[index]+" \t Dest IP: "+destIP[index]+" \t 
destPort: "+destPort[index]+" \t Protocol: "+protocol[index]+" \t size: 
"+size[index]"\n"); 
//              fileout.println("Time: " +time[index]+"SourceIP: 
"+srcIP[index]+" \t SourcePort: "+srcPort[index]+" \t Dest IP: 
"+destIP[index]+" \t destPort: "+destPort[index]+" \t Protocol: 
"+protocol[index]+" \t size: "+size[index]); 
              System.out.println("Index: "+index); 
              index ++; 
     } 
          } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////           
// Socket Pair Filtering:  
// - determine connection between two socket pairs with designated IP 
address, 
// - record their time 
// - record their size 
// - record their sum of size (to current time) 
 
// i is the counter for the raw database.           
// jMax is the maximum number of connections.     
          jMax = 0; 
// connectionCount[jMax] is the counter of the time-IPsocketPair-bytes 
Database 
          for (i=0; i < index; i++){ 
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                update = false; 
//                System.out.println("IP Address: 
"+ia+"SrcIP"+srcIP[i]+"DestIP"+destIP[i]); 
  if ((srcIP[i].equals(ia)) || (destIP[i].equals(ia))){ 
//Initialized interested database for specific IP address (of honeynet) 
                      timeCurrent [jMax] = time [i]; 
//                      
System.out.println("True!"+timeCurrent[jMax]+"\t time = "+ time[i]); 
                      srcIPCurrent [jMax] = srcIP[i];   
                      srcPortCurrent [jMax] = srcPort[i];   
                      destIPCurrent [jMax] = destIP[i];   
                      destPortCurrent [jMax] = destPort[i]; 
                      protocolCurrent [jMax] = protocol[i]; 
                      sizeCurrent [jMax] = size[i]; 
// j is the counter for the connection database 
                      for (j = 0; j < jMax; j++){ 




// This implies an older ip socket pair exists.  Update the sum of size 
and count for that connection.     
                              sumSizeCurrent[jMax] = 
sumSizeCurrent[j]+sizeCurrent[jMax]; 
                              connectionCount[jMax] = 
connectionCount[j]+1; 
                              update = true; 
                          } 
 
                      } 
// This implies a new ip pair since the search is always in strictly 
incremental time. 
                       
                      if (update != true){ 
                          sumSizeCurrent [jMax] = size[i]; 
                          connectionCount [jMax]= 1; 
                                      } 
                      jMax++; 
                } 
          } 
      
 






//Print the Last packets to file:           
        PrintWriter socketPairSizeCount = new PrintWriter(new 
FileWriter("socketPairSizeCount"+filename+ia+".txt"));           
        for (k = 0; k < jMax; k++){ 
 //       socketPairSizeCount.println(k+"\t SN: "+ snLast[k]+"\t time: 
" + timeLast[k]+" \t source: "+sourceLast[k]+" \t srcport: 
"+srcportLast[k]+" \t dest: "+destLast[k]+" \t destport: 
"+destportLast[k]+" \t protocol: "+protocolLast[k]+" \t size: 
"+sizeLast[k]+"\t CumSize: "+cumSize[index]+"\n"); 
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        socketPairSizeCount.println(timeCurrent[k]+" 
\t"+srcIPCurrent[k]+" \t"+srcPortCurrent[k]+" \t"+destIPCurrent[k]+" 
\t"+destPortCurrent[k]+" \t"+protocolCurrent[k]+" \t"+sizeCurrent[k]+" 
\t"+sumSizeCurrent[k]+"\t"+connectionCount[k]); 
  } 
//        socketPairSizeCount.println ("\nTotal Last Packets = "+jMax);  
        socketPairSizeCount.close(); 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
///////////////////// 
        fr.close(); 
   //Start-To be removed; for debugging only 
//      fileout.close(); 
   //End-To be removed. 
 




//Obtain meta-data of Last packet of the connection between two 
//machinces. 
//Name tcpdumpAnalysisConnectionLastPacket.java 
// Author@ Harry Lim 






class TcpdumpAnalysisConnectionLastPacket { 
  public static void main (String args[]) throws IOException { 
     
 String Input, filename; 
        int index= 0; 
        int max = 500000; 
        int [] sn, size, cumSize; 
        double [] time; 
        String [] source, srcport, dest, destport, protocol; 
        StringTokenizer str; 
         
        //Last packet database 
        int i,j,jMax,k, update; 
        int indexLast = 0; 
        int maxLast = 500000; 
        int [] snLast, sizeLast, cumSizeLast; 
        double [] timeLast; 
  String garbage; 
        String [] sourceLast, srcportLast, destLast, destportLast, 
protocolLast; 
         
 
         
        //Initialise data array 
        size = new int [max]; 
        time = new double [max];         
        source = new String [max]; 
        srcport = new String [max]; 
        dest = new String [max]; 
        destport = new String [max]; 
        protocol =  new String [max]; 
        
        //Initialise Last packet data array 
 
        sizeLast = new int [max]; 
        cumSizeLast= new int [max]; 
        timeLast = new double [max];         
        sourceLast = new String [max]; 
        srcportLast = new String [max]; 
        destLast = new String [max]; 
        destportLast = new String [max]; 
        protocolLast =  new String [max]; 
 
         
        //Reading from Tcpdump txt file  
         
        filename = args[0]; 
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  FileReader fr = new FileReader(filename); 
   BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(fr); 
   while ((Input = br.readLine()) != null) { 
       str = new StringTokenizer (Input); 
              if (str.countTokens() == 9) 
              { 
//                  System.out.println("Error: Wrong number of 
tokens"); 
//                  return; 
//              } 
              garbage  = str.nextToken(); 
              time [index] = Double.parseDouble(str.nextToken());   
              source [index] = str.nextToken();   
              srcport [index] = str.nextToken();   
              dest [index] = str.nextToken();   
              destport [index] = str.nextToken(); 
              protocol [index] = str.nextToken(); 
              size [index] = Integer.parseInt(str.nextToken()); 
//            cumSize[index] = Integer.parseInt(str.nextToken()); 
//            System.out.println("SN: "+ sn[index]+"\t time: " + 
time[index]+" \t source: "+source[index]+" \t srcport: 
"+srcport[index]+" \t dest: "+dest[index]+" \t destport: 
"+destport[index]+" \t protocol: "+protocol[index]+" \t size: 
"+size[index]+"\t CumSize: "+cumSize[index]+"\n"); 
//            fileout.println("SN: "+ sn[index]+"\t time: " + 
time[index]+" \t source: "+source[index]+" \t srcport: 
"+srcport[index]+" \t dest: "+dest[index]+" \t destport: 
"+destport[index]+" \t protocol: "+protocol[index]+" \t size: 
"+size[index]+"\t CumSize: "+cumSize[index]+"\n"); 
              System.out.println("Time: "+ time[index]); 
              index ++; 
     } 
          } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
////////////////////           
// Last packet analysis: determine last packet connection between two 
ip address. 
 
// i is the counter for the raw database.           
          i = 0; 
// j is the counter for the Last packet database. 
          j = 0; 
// jMax is the maximum number of last packets.     
          jMax = 0; 
          for (i=0; i < index; i++){ 
              update = 0; 
              for (j=0; j < jMax; j++){ 
                   if ((( source[i].equals(sourceLast[j]) && 
dest[i].equals(destLast[j])) || ( source[i].equals(destLast[j]) && 
dest[i].equals(sourceLast[j]))) && (time [i] >= timeLast [j])){ 
// This implies an older ip pair exists. 
                      timeLast [j] = time [i]; 
                      sourceLast [j] = source[i];   
                      srcportLast [j] = srcport[i];   
                      destLast [j] = dest[i];   
                      destportLast [j] = destport[i]; 
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                      protocolLast [j] = protocol[i]; 
                      sizeLast [j] = size[i]; 
                      cumSizeLast [j] = cumSizeLast[j] + size[i]; 
                      update = 1; 
                   //populate the rest of the data less the source and 
dest ip. 
                   } 
              } 
              if ((update != 1)){ 
// This implies a new ip pair since the search is always in strictly 
incremental time. 
                      timeLast [jMax] = time [i]; 
                      sourceLast [jMax] = source[i];   
                      srcportLast [jMax] = srcport[i];   
                      destLast [jMax] = dest[i];   
                      destportLast [jMax] = destport[i]; 
                      protocolLast [jMax] = protocol[i]; 
                      sizeLast [jMax] = size[i]; 
                      cumSizeLast [jMax] = size [i]; 
                      jMax++; 
                  } 
                  } 






//Print the Last packets to file:           
        PrintWriter lastPackets = new PrintWriter(new 
FileWriter("lastPacket"+filename+".txt"));           
        for (k = 0; k < jMax; k++){ 
 //       lastPackets.println(k+"\t SN: "+ snLast[k]+"\t time: " + 
timeLast[k]+" \t source: "+sourceLast[k]+" \t srcport: 
"+srcportLast[k]+" \t dest: "+destLast[k]+" \t destport: 
"+destportLast[k]+" \t protocol: "+protocolLast[k]+" \t size: 
"+sizeLast[k]+"\t CumSize: "+cumSize[index]+"\n"); 




  } 
//        lastPackets.println ("\nTotal Last Packets = "+jMax);  
        lastPackets.close(); 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
///////////////////// 
        fr.close(); 
//    fileout.close(); 
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